At first glance, the big splash from KAN news on Monday night about new revelations of related to October 7 was overblown. We have known for several months an extensive and detailed list of those failures, and as a journalist, one could not help but view many of the disclosures as an attempt by the media to reinvent a story which is mostly written on a day where some editors must have felt they were short on truly new news. But at a second glance, there were two important points from the list of “revelations” which should influence how the Israeli intelligence community will be reconfigured and rebuilt in the coming months and years.
Previous warnings of a regarding which the IDF has struggled to explain its ignoring those warnings, have shown that a junior level intelligence officer in Unit 8200 named “V” warned her supervisor, Lt. Col. “A” in September 2023.
A then did a mix of not passing on the warnings of invasion up to IDF intelligence chief Ma., Gen. Aharon Huliya, or passed them on only sometime on October 3 in a vague fashion.
The bottom line until now was that Unit 8200 neither widely shared nor put any special emphasis on V’s warnings of a Hamas invasion. The two new pieces were the detailed number of hostages to be kidnapped as well as the idea that the knew about the newest warnings from Unit 8200. One of the reasons that Unit 8200 and others in IDF intelligence defended themselves against taking a Hamas invasion seriously was because they warned of.
