The ceasefire proposed by the Biden administration splits the difference between Hamas and Israel on the critical issues facing the and Gaza in the future. It also leaves a variety of secondary, but still crucial issues up in the air and open to being heavily influenced in one direction or another by the relevant parties. First, Israel has beaten Hamas as a in all parts of Gaza – and that is an established fact.
In October, Hamas hoped that it would retain all of its military power and c and receive thousands of Palestinian security prisoners in exchange for the return of the Israeli hostages. Hamas believed that Israel was weak, queasy around the blood of its soldiers, distracted by internal dissension, and afraid of global criticism. With its taking operational control of most of the Rafah area (while so far not entering deep into certain extremely densely populated areas), Israel has completed taking apart essentially all 24 of Hamas’s battalions.
There were 10 in northern Gaza which fell quickly, four in Khan Yunis and four in central Gaza, which fell by February, and four more in Rafah which disintegrated over the last month. Even if there is no ceasefire, top IDF officials have suggested that by around late June or early July – and possibly already - there will be no consistently organized national military Hamas group left to fight. There are still many thousands and maybe as many as 10,000 Hamas fighters who have fled, faded into the civilian population, and are.