EVM Fixing Theory and Lok Sabha Elections: Realibility vs Rhetoric
The fallibility or otherwise of the EVMs (electronic voting machines) has been proven incontrovertibly and so many times, in favour of the EVMs, that one would think that there need not be any controversy whatsoever on their reliability. And yet, as we approach June 4, the day results for the 2024 General Elections would be announced, the manufactured buzz around the fixing EVMs continues unabated. The Supreme Court recently dealt with the EVMs and after a detailed hearing ruled unambiguously in favour of the infallibility of the process. Apart from the technical safeguards in the EVM unit itself, the process involved in the entire conduct of elections, is what makes the whole EVM fixing theory so laughable. Let us briefly understand the process. The EVM Unit and How It Works The EVM consists of three units, namely, the ballot unit, the control unit, and the VVPAT. The ballot unit, acting as a keyboard or a keypad consists of 16 keys/buttons one of which the voter has to press when he exercises his choice to vote for any candidate. The keys are political party and candidate agnostic. The serial numbers, names of the candidates and the symbols of the political parties/candidates are physically pasted on the ballot unit so as to enable the voter to identify the corresponding key/button against the respective candidate and the symbol. EVM: When was it introduced? The Electronic Voting Machine (EVM), the replacement of the ballot box is mainstay in the electoral process. First conceived in 1977 in the Election Commission, the Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (ECIL), Hyderabad was assigned the task to design and develop it. In 1979 a proto-type was developed, which was demonstrated by the Election Commission before the representatives of political parties on 6th August, 1980. The Bharat Electronic Ltd. (BEL), Bangalore, another public-sector undertaking, was co-opted along with ECIL to manufacture EVMs once a broad consensus was reached on its introduction. First time use of EVMs occurred in the general election in Kerala in May, 1982; however, the absence of a specific law prescribing its use led to the Supreme Court striking down that election. Subsequently, in 1989, the Parliament amended the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to create a provision for the use of EVMs in the elections (chapter 3). A general consensus on its introduction could be reached only in 1998 and these were used in 25 Legislative Assembly constituencies spread across three states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Delhi. Its use was further expanded in 1999 to 45 Parliamentary Constituencies and later, in February 2000, to 45 Assembly Constituencies of the Haryana Assembly elections. In the State Assembly elections, held in May 2001, in the states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Puducherry and West Bengal, the EVMs were used in all the Assembly Constituencies. Since then, for every State Assembly election, the Commission has used the EVMs. In 2004, in the General Election to the Lok Sabha, the EVMs (more than one million) were used in all 543 Parliamentary Constituencies in the country. The control unit, which is also called the master unit, remains with the polling/presiding officer. The control unit has burnt memory, which is agnostic and does not have the names of the candidates and symbols allotted to the candidates or political parties. Before the ballot unit can be used by a voter, the polling/presiding officer is required to press the ‘BALLOT’ button on the control unit, thereby enabling the voter to cast his vote on the ballot unit. The data stored in the control unit, upon the vote being cast, records and counts the button or the key pressed on the ballot unit. The data, therefore, records the total number of votes as cast by the voters, and the key or the button number on the ballot unit pressed by the voters for casting their vote. After the vote is cast and the control unit has recorded the vote, a loud beep sound confirms the registration of the vote. As soon as the voter presses the ‘blue button’ and casts his/her vote on the ballot unit, an LED against the candidate button glows red and the control unit sends the command to the VVPAT. The VVPAT then prints the VVPAT slip comprising of the serial number, candidate name and the symbol. The VVPAT slip, after being printed, is displayed through the glass window which is illuminated for 7 seconds to enable the voter to know and verify the serial number, the candidate and the symbol for whom they have voted. The VVPAT slip then gets cut from the roll and falls into the box/compartment attached to the VVPAT. The fall sensor in the VVPAT then sends a confirmation to the control unit. The control unit records the vote. EVMs are standalone machines which cannot be connected to internet. The EVMs do not have any ports so as to enable a person to have access to the burnt memory. Tamer-proof Technology The EVM setup is designed in a rudimentary fashion and the EVM units are standalone and non-networked, that is, they are unconnectable to any other third-party machine or input source. In case any unauthorised attempt is made to access the microcontroller or memory of the EVM, the Unauthorised Access Detection Mechanism (UADM) disables it permanently. The advanced encryption techniques and strong mutual authentication or reception capability rules out the deciphering of communication between the EVM units and any unauthorised interaction with the EVM. The programme loaded in the EVM is key hashed and burnt into a One Time Programmable microcontroller chip at the time of manufacturing, thus dispelling any possibility of tampering. All the three units of the EVM – ballot unit, control unit and VVPAT, have microcontrollers in which the respective firmware is burnt. The burnt programme/code is unalterable and cannot be modified after the EVM is delivered/supplied by the manufacturer to ECI. Every key press of the control unit is dynamically coded, thus making it impossible to decode the signal [...]